Belief-based and analytic processing in transitive inference 5 conflict between belief-based and analytic processing is avoided because a decision is made at the outset of each problem as to whether responses will be determined by beliefs or analytic processes. The basis for this decision is some superficial aspect of the reasoning problem. In the parallel-competitive models, belief-based and analytic processes proceed simultaneously and each produces a response. When the two responses differ (VU, IB problems) the conflict must be resolved. Analytic processes can overrule the belief-based processes to some extent, but the greater speed of the belief-based processing means that it will sometimes precede and neutralise responses of analytic processes. In the defaultinterventionist model, shallow heuristic (belief-based) processes cue a default mental model which yields an initial response, which might subsequently be confirmed or revised by analytic processes. Evans showed that the three classes of models can be mapped to the same equation; therefore distinguishing between them on the basis of acceptance rates alone is not straightforward. Including additional independent and dependent variables and procedural constraints might be helpful in this regard. Evans and Curtis-Holmes (2005) examined the effect of time constraints on acceptance rates for VB, VU, IB, IU categorical syllogisms. Conclusion evaluation time was manipulated with premise encoding time held constant. Participants in the free time condition relied more on analytic reasoning and less on belief-based reasoning than those in the rapid response condition who were allowed just 5 secs to read and evaluate the conclusion. The difference was due to lower acceptance of VU conclusions and higher acceptance of IB conclusions in the rapid response condition. The findings were interpreted in terms of the selective scrutiny model (Evans, et al, 1983; 1993) . In this pre-emptive, beliefs-first model, participants tend to accept believable conclusions. They are more likely to engage in analytic processing when conclusions are unbelievable. More time was available for analytic processing in the freetime condition therefore more VU conclusions were accepted in this condition. However, the Belief-based and analytic processing in transitive inference 6 findings do not preclude other accounts (Evans, 2007) . Quayle and Ball (2000) tested a reasoning-first model of belief bias. According to their metacognitive uncertainty model, people attempt to reason analytically, but they default to belief-based processing as a second best option when the demands of the reasoning task exceed their working memory capacity. In Experiment 1, indeterminately invalid categorical syllogisms were more difficult and were evaluated with lower confidence than valid syllogisms. This was attributed to the higher working memory load imposed by the invalid syllogisms. Experiment 3 examined more directly the role of working memory in the larger believability effect on invalid problems. The validity by believability interaction was present only for participants with low working memory capacity. These findings supported the metacognitive uncertainty model and the general notion that people resort to belief-based processing when the demands of analytic processing exceed available capacity. Stupple and Ball (2008) examined the effect of figural complexity on belief-based and analytical processing. They presented VB, VU, IB, and IU categorical syllogisms in two different figures. Figure refers to the order of the three classes in the premises. The standard effects of validity and believability and their interaction were observed on acceptance rates.
The believability effect was larger for syllogisms with the more complex figure in which premise integration is more difficult. Premise inspection times were longer for conflict (VU, IB) problems than for no-conflict (VB, IU) problems. The findings were interpreted as providing strongest support for parallel processing models. Sloman's (1996) parallel model includes associative (non-analytic) and rule-based (analytic) processes, which produce different outputs on VU and IB problems. The resulting conflict takes time to resolve. Roberts and Sykes (2003) examined belief bias in spatial and temporal relational inference problems, rather than categorical syllogisms. Each problem consisted of four premises which defined the spatial or temporal relations among five entities, and a conclusion allowed only one arrangement of the entities therefore invalid conclusions were determinately invalid. In Experiment 1, reasoning accuracy was higher with parallel presentation in which the premises and conclusion were available simultaneously than with serial presentation in which premises were presented one at a time and were removed when the conclusion appeared. Significant analytic processing occurred in both conditions but was stronger in the easier, parallel condition than in the more difficult, serial condition. Beliefbased processing was observed in the parallel condition, but not in the serial condition.
Belief-based processing was more evident in Experiment 3 which employed two-model problems in which two different arrangements of the entities were consistent with the premises. The interaction between validity and believability was present when indeterminately (but not determinately) invalid conclusions were analysed. This replicated the pattern usually observed with categorical syllogisms. However, none of the models developed to account for belief bias in categorical syllogisms could account for all of Roberts and Sykes' findings. Some findings supported the view that participants resort to non-analytic processes when analytic processing is difficult. However, although analytic responding was reduced, belief-based responding was not always observed in the more difficult conditions.
The current project extended belief bias research to transitive inference. The first aim was to determine the extent to which belief-based and analytic processing are used in transitive inference. No existing studies appear to have addressed this issue. To the extent that both
Belief-based and analytic processing in transitive inference 8 types of processes are employed, significant effects of validity and believability should be observed on conclusion acceptance rates. To the extent that belief-based and analytic processes come into conflict during reasoning, VU and IB problems in which these processes conflict should be more difficult than VB and IU problems in which there is no such conflict.
This would be evidenced by a significant Validity × Believability interaction when acceptance rates are expressed in terms of accuracy.
The second aim was to examine the effects on belief-based and analytic processing of experimental manipulations previously shown to influence the difficulty of transitive inference. In Experiment 1, premise encoding/integration difficulty was manipulated by varying the time allowed for this to occur. Conclusion evaluation time was also manipulated.
In Experiments 2 and 3, premise encoding/integration difficulty was manipulated by varying the presentation order of the premises and the markedness of the relational terms in the premises, respectively. Previous research using categorical syllogisms suggests that there will be more belief-based processing and less analytic reasoning in the more difficult conditions.
However, Robert and Sykes' (2003) research on relational inferences, which are more comparable than categorical syllogisms to transitive inferences, yielded mixed findings. The effects of these manipulations on conclusion acceptance rates and reasoning accuracy will be examined to determine whether conflict and no-conflict problems are differentially affected.
The third aim was to assess participants' awareness of the conflict between belief-based and analytic processes. Expressed levels of confidence might reflect this. If so, confidence should be higher for no-conflict problems than for conflict problems. The fourth aim was to examine two potential correlates of the ability to resolve conflict between belief-based and analytic processing. To address this issue, measures of fluid intelligence and premise integration ability were administered in Experiment 3.
In transitive inference problems, participants are given premises (e.g., a > b, b > c) and
Belief-based and analytic processing in transitive inference 9 they evaluate or infer the relation between nonadjacent elements (a > c (Prado, Van der Henst, & Noveck, 2008; Trabasso, Riley, & Wilson, 1975 Evidence from a study that used a dual-task paradigm with probe reaction time as the secondary task (Maybery, Bain, & Halford, 1986) suggested that premise encoding and premise integration impose different types of demand. The presence of negation (e.g., not above) and marked lexical terms (e.g., below) in the premises increased the time required to encode the premises, but did not affect secondary task performance, whereas premise integration increased probe reaction time on the secondary task, relative to a task where no integration was required. The processing load imposed by premise integration appears to occur because no element can be assigned to its position in the array on the basis of a single premise; rather the premises must be considered jointly. For example, Tony is taller than Chris tells us that Tony is in either first or second position, but we can only determine which by considering the second premise. Halford, Wilson and Phillips (1998) demonstrated that premise integration is a complex ternary-relational process. The two binary-relational premises (a > b; b > c) must be integrated to construct the ordered triple (a > b > c) and this constitutes a ternary relation. Thus, premise encoding and integration components of transitive inference task are more demanding than conclusion evaluation.
Research in cognitive development (e.g., Halford, 1984; Thayer & Collyer, 1978) showed that three-term transitive inference problems are susceptible to a non-integrative strategy that involves labelling the end elements. Element a is labelled as large because it occurs only once (Andrews & Halford, 1998; Halford, 1984) .
Thus, 5-term problems were used in the current research.
Belief-based and analytic processing were examined using four types of problems (shown in In VB and IU problems, the four premises were all believable, whereas in the VU and IB problems two premises were believable and two were unbelievable. The unbelievable premises were unlikely, rather than definitionally false. For example, the IB problem in Table   1 includes the unbelievable premise The tractor is faster than the train. Although trains generally travel faster than tractors, this might not be true in every situation. Unbelievable conclusions were also empirically unlikely (e.g., The grapefruit is sweeter than the mandarin). Definitionally false statements (e.g., Some cats are not animals) which are included in the categorical syllogisms in some studies (e.g., Klauer, Musch & Naumer, 2000; Stupple & Ball, 2008) yield larger believability effects.
The transitive inference problems were one-model problems in which only one arrangement of the elements was compatible with the premises. Invalid conclusions were
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determinately invalid in the current research whereas in the studies of belief bias in categorical syllogisms reviewed above they were indeterminately invalid.
Although the research was not specifically designed to distinguish between specific models, the findings will be considered in relation to reasoning-first, parallel-process, default interventionist models. Pre-emptive models in which conclusion believability triggers beliefbased processing will not be considered because the conclusions and premises were not simultaneously available in the present procedure. Delaying processing of the premises until the conclusions were presented would not be a workable strategy.
Parallel-process models would provide a ready and natural explanation of lower accuracy and lower confidence for conflict (VU, IB) than no-conflict (VB, IU) problems because conflict occurs only when both processes are applied. In the default interventionist model, individuals who make conscious efforts to inhibit their default belief-based responses might realise the conflict (Evans, 2007) . However, this is not guaranteed because analytic processing does not always occur. In reasoning-first models, individuals will first attempt to use analytic processing. When this fails, they will default to belief-based processing which yields correct responses on no-conflict problems and incorrect responses on conflict problems.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 extended Evans and Curtis-Holmes (2005) research by examining the effects of premise encoding/integration time and conclusion evaluation time on belief-based and analytic processing in transitive inference. Higher acceptance rates were expected for valid than invalid conclusions, and for believable than unbelievable conclusions. Based on research showing that premise integration is more demanding than conclusion evaluation (Maybery, et al., 1986) belief-based and analytic processing were expected to be more sensitive to premise encoding/integration time than to conclusion evaluation time. More
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Accuracy and confidence were expected to be higher for no-conflict (VB, IU) problems than for conflict (VU, IB) problems. There are two potential loci of the conflict in VU and IB problems. The conflict might occur during premise integration when unbelievable premises conflict with prior beliefs and make premise integration more difficult (Thompson, 1996) . If so, then conflict problems should be more sensitive than no-conflict problems to premise encoding/integration time. Conflict might also occur during conclusion evaluation when the VU and IB conclusions are consistent either with prior beliefs or with analytic processing, but not with both. If so, then conflict problems should be more sensitive than no-conflict problems to conclusion evaluation time.
Method Participants
The participants were 104 students (19 of them male, 85 female) enrolled in undergraduate Psychology courses. Their mean age was 24.26 years (SD = 8.27 years). All were native speakers of English. Twenty-six participants were assigned to each of four conditions reflecting combinations of two premise encoding/integration times (10 sec, 20 sec) and two conclusion evaluation times (5 sec, 10 sec). There were no significant differences in age or gender balance across the conditions.
Stimuli and Procedure
Each transitive inference problem had four premises which when integrated yielded an ordered five-term sequence of the form, a > b > c > d > e. The elements in each problem were drawn from the same category (e.g., animals, vehicles, household items). Transitive relations (e.g., taller-shorter, heavier-lighter, faster-slower) related the elements in the premises and conclusions. Unmarked (e.g., taller) and marked (e.g., shorter) forms were each used twice in
Belief-based and analytic processing in transitive inference 13 each premise set. Valid conclusions were stated in the form b > d. Invalid conclusions were stated in the form d > b and were always determinately invalid. Four problem types were generated by varying conclusion validity and believability. There were sixteen test problems, four of each type (VB, VU, IB, IU) and two practice problems with the same form as the test problems, but with neutral content. Examples of the test problems are shown in Table 1 .
Group administration was used. Problems were presented using PowerPoint software running on a laptop computer, and a data projector to display the screen images on a large white screen. Instructions were displayed on the screen and read aloud by the experimenter.
Participants were told that they should assume that the premises were true. Even if they did not believe the premises were always true, they should respond as if they were always true.
They were instructed to read the premises carefully and think about how each premise related to the others. When the conclusion appeared they were to read and evaluate it in terms of the premises, then record their Yes/No response and their confidence in their decision on the sheet provided. Confidence was rated on a 3-point scale (0 = low; 1 = medium; 2 = high).
Two practice problems were presented. A READY signal was displayed for 3 secs. Then the premises were displayed simultaneously for 30 secs, in a quasi-random top-down order.
The premise a > b never appeared in top position. The conclusion was then presented for 10 secs, followed by a RESPOND NOW signal for 10 secs, during which participants recorded their responses. Feedback was provided after each practice problem. The premises from the preceding problem, the corresponding 5-term sequence (expressed in the form a > b > c > d > e, but using the elements from the problem), and the conclusion were displayed on the same slide, along with a statement indicating the validity of the conclusion. The instructions and feedback were intended to encourage integration of the premises into an ordered series.
Participants were then informed of the specific durations they would experience in the test problems. These differed according to the condition to which they were assigned. These
Belief-based and analytic processing in transitive inference 14 durations were specified in the PowerPoint presentations and timing was controlled by this software. No feedback was provided on test problems. Otherwise, the procedure was identical to the practice problems. The 16 test problems were arranged into four, 4-problem blocks, each containing one problem of each type (VB, VU, IB, IU). A 30-sec break was inserted after each block. The top-down order of the premises did not differ across problem types.
Following the reasoning task, 91 participants rated the plausibility of the conclusions of the test problems (presented alone) using a 7-point scale (1 = extremely implausible to 7 = extremely plausible).
Results & Discussion
Manipulation check. A repeated measures t-test confirmed that believable conclusions (M = 6.22; SE = 0.068) were significantly more plausible than unbelievable conclusions (M = 2.01; SE = 0.059), t (90) = 43.18, p < .001.
Acceptance rates. Acceptance rates for VU, IB, and IU items were each based on four items. VB acceptance rates were based on three items due to a wording error in one item. The acceptance rates (proportion of Yes responses) are shown in Specifically, significantly more VU conclusions were accepted in the 20-sec than the 10- That reasoning was influenced by premise encoding time but not by conclusion
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Conclusion generation or evaluation is quite straightforward once integration has occurred.
The interactions show that the locus of the conflict between belief-based and analytic processes was at premise integration rather than conclusion evaluation. Detection of conflict during premise integration is clearly consistent with parallel-process models because beliefbased and analytic processes operate from the outset and the conflict would be apparent when unbelievable premises were encountered. The 20-sec condition would allow more time to resolve the conflict in favour of analytic processing. In the default interventionist model, an initial mental model would be generated using belief-based processes. For the VU problem (Table 1) for example, this might consist of the fruits named in the premises and prior beliefs about their relative sweetness. If no analytic processing occurs, the initial model would be retained, no conflict would be experienced, and the conclusion would be rejected. This would occur more frequently in the 10-sec than in the 20-sec condition, which would allow more time for analytic processing to inhibit beliefs. In reasoning-first models, belief-based responses are made when analytic processing fails. The shorter premise integration time increased the difficulty of premise integration, so default to belief-based responses would be more likely in the 10-sec condition. The effect would be evident on conflict problems.
Confidence ratings. The mean confidence ratings are shown in Table 2 . A mixed 2(validity) × 2 (believability) × 2 (premise encoding time) × 2 (conclusion evaluation time)
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of believability, F (1, 100) = 16.67, p < .001, η showed that the difference between conflict and no-conflict problems was more pronounced in the 20-sec than 10-sec condition. Having extra time for premise encoding and integration increased confidence as in Shynkaruk and Thompson (2006) and produced greater awareness of the difference between conflict and no-conflict problems.
In summary, the patterns of acceptance and confidence rates suggest that belief-based and analytical processes were employed in transitive inference. Participants experienced difficulty and were less confident when these processes conflicted. The locus of the conflict was premise integration rather than conclusion evaluation. More belief-based processing and less analytical processing occurred when premise integration time was shorter. Conflict problems were more affected by premise integration time than no-conflict problems.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, premises were always presented in scrambled order. Premise integration under such conditions has been analysed as involving ternary-relational processing . This level of complexity makes transitive inference very difficult for children under 5 years of age (Andrews & Halford, 1998 , 2002 Halford, 1984) and for adults with frontal lobe impairments due to degenerative effects of normal aging (Andrews & Todd, Belief-based Viskontas, Holyoak, & Knowlton, 2005) and dementia (Waltz., et al., 1999 (Waltz., et al., , 2004 . In Waltz et al., 1999) . The chaining strategy is binary-relational because just one premise needs to be considered at a time. More analytic processing and less belief-based processing were expected in the consistent order condition.
Another modification was the inclusion of two problems sets. A new problem set was generated by reversing the conclusions of the original items as in Roberts and Sykes (2003) .
For example, the valid, believable conclusion The cow is larger than the dog became The dog is larger than the cow which (given the premises in Table 1 ) is invalid and unbelievable.
Thus the problems in both sets had the same premises, but different conclusions. The VB, VU, IB, and IU items in the original problem set became IU, IB, VU, and VB items respectively, in the new problem set. This avoids confounding premise content with validity and believability (Thompson, 1996) . However, it is still the case that conflict problems in both sets had some unbelievable premises whereas the no-conflict problems did not.
Method Participants
The sample consisted of 100 students (17 of them male, 83 female) who were enrolled in undergraduate Psychology courses. Their mean age was 24.99 years (SD = 8.18 years). All were native speakers of English. There were 25 participants in each of the four conditions reflecting the combination of two problem sets and two premise presentation orders.
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Stimuli and Procedure
In each set, there were 16 test problems, four of each type, VB, VU, IB, and IU. In the scrambled condition, the premises were presented in scrambled order (as in Experiment 1). In the consistent condition, the top-down order of the premises was a Acceptance rates. Preliminary analyses revealed no significant effect or interactions involving problem set, so this variable was dropped from subsequent analyses. Acceptance rates are shown in The effects of premise presentation order on belief-based and analytic processing are clearly consistent with reasoning-first models. Analytic processing is less likely to fail when premise integration complexity is reduced (consistent condition) therefore there will be less need to default to belief-based processing. The effects are also consistent with parallelprocess models because consistent order of the premises would make it easier for analytic processes to dominate belief-based processes. The situation in relation to default interventionist models is less clear. However, to the extent that analytic processing occurs, it would likely be more successful in the consistent than scrambled condition.
Confidence ratings. Table 3 Experiment 2 replicated the main findings of Experiment 1. Acceptance and confidence rates suggested that belief-based and analytical processes were employed in transitive inference. Participants experienced difficulty and were less confident when these processes conflicted. Less belief-based processing and more analytic processing occurred when premise
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Experiment 3
Experiment 3 examined another factor that potentially affects the difficulty of premise encoding and integration, namely, lexical markedness. Premises that use marked forms of the relational expression (e.g., Tom is shorter than Mary) are known to take longer to encode than those with the corresponding unmarked (e.g., Mary is taller than Tom) forms (Evans et al., 1993) , presumably because marked forms are first converted to the unmarked form (Maybery, et al., 1986) . For example, for the VB problem in Table 1 , the premises, The
mouse is smaller than the dog and The dog is smaller than the goat would be converted to
The dog is larger than the mouse and The goat is larger than the dog, respectively prior to integration with the other premises. Given that the time available for premise encoding and integration was limited, use of unmarked forms only should reduce premise encoding time and leave more time available for premise integration. If so, premise integration should be facilitated in the unmarked only condition, and this should result in more analytic and less belief-based processing than in the mixed markedness condition.
Most theorists agree that analytic reasoning is related to general intelligence while nonanalytic processing is not. According to the default interventionist model, higher ability individuals are more likely to engage analytic processes (Evans, 2007) . According to reasoning-first models, initial attempts at analytic processing would be more successful in higher ability individuals, so default to belief-based processing would occur less often (Quayle & Ball, 2000) . According to parallel-process models (Sloman, 1996) analytic processes would be better able to dominate belief-based processes in higher than lower ability individuals.
Two potential correlates of the capacity to resolve conflict between belief-based and
Belief-based and analytic processing in transitive inference 23 analytic processes were examined. These were fluid intelligence and premise integration ability. According to Stanovitch and West (2008) associations with fluid intelligence are more likely when the reasoning task involves a conflict. The VU and IB problems meet this requirement. Stanovitch and West suggest that tests of fluid intelligence directly tap the analytic ability required to detect and resolve such conflict.
To the extent that accuracy on conflict problems depends on successful premise encoding and integration, we might expect individual differences in premise integration ability to predict reasoning accuracy. This ability was assessed in a subset of the sample using the nterm premise integration task (Andrews, Birney & Halford, 2006) . Participants mentally construct sequences of three, four, or five letters, based on premises. The relations depicted in the premises are arbitrary (e.g., Z > T), they bear no relation to prior beliefs; therefore the task cannot be performed using belief-based processes.
Fluid ability and N-term scores should each predict accuracy on conflict problems, which require analytic processing. This should remain so after controlling for accuracy on the noconflict problems, which can be performed using either belief-based or analytic processing.
Method Participants
The sample consisted of 152 students (38 of them male, 114 female) enrolled in undergraduate Psychology courses. Their mean age was 21.54 years (SD = 7.04 years). Most (96%) were native speakers of English. There were 38 participants in each of the four conditions reflecting the combinations of two problem sets and two markedness conditions. A subgroup of 58 participants (22 from the unmarked only and 36 from mixed markedness condition) completed the N-term premise integration task in a second session.
Stimuli and Procedure
The premises were always presented in scrambled order. Premise encoding time and
Belief-based and analytic processing in transitive inference 24 conclusion evaluation time were held constant at 20 secs and 5 secs, respectively. In the mixed markedness condition, both marked (e.g., shorter than, smaller than) and unmarked forms (e.g., taller than, larger than) were used in the premises (as in Experiments 1 and 2). In the unmarked only condition, only the unmarked forms were used. The markedness of the relational terms in the practice problems matched the test problems in each condition.
Fluid intelligence was assessed using the Culture Fair Test, Scale 2, Form A (Cattell & Cattell, 1973) . Four subtests were administered using the standard instructions and applying the specified time limits. The maximum total score was 46.
The n-term task (Andrews, et al., 2006 ) required participants to use the premises to construct an ordered series of three, four, or five alphabetic letters. Examples are shown in Figure 1 . There were three, four and five premises for the 3-term, 4-term, and 5-term items, respectively. One premise in each set consisted of a nonadjacent pair of letters, and the remaining premises related adjacent letters. A combination of < and > symbols was used in the premises which were displayed in random top-down order on the left side of the screen.
They remained visible until the participants had typed the required number of letters. On the right side was a row of 3, 4, or 5 boxes with > signs between them. At the outset of each item, the left-most box was highlighted in white. The first letter typed appeared here and remained in view momentarily before being replaced by an asterisk. Subsequent boxes were highlighted only when a valid letter (one that appeared in the premises) was typed in the preceding box. When the final letter had been entered, the entire sequence of letters was displayed briefly. Participants were advised to construct the entire sequence mentally before beginning to type, because they were unable to reorder the letters once they had been entered.
No time limit was imposed. The items were blocked according to series length. There was one practice item and eight test items in each block. The maximum total score was 24.
Results & Discussion
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Acceptance rates. Preliminary analyses revealed no significant main effect or interactions involving problem set, so this variable was dropped from subsequent analyses. Acceptance rates are shown in Table 4 The effects of markedness on belief-based and analytic processing are consistent with reasoning-first models, parallel-process, and default interventionist models for similar reasons to those described in Experiment 2.
Confidence ratings. The mean confidence ratings are shown in Table 4 (Maybery et al., 1986) and had flow-on effects on acceptance rates, but that the effect had dissipated by the time confidence ratings were made. This interpretation could be investigated in future research, but it is consistent with Shynkaruk and Thompson (2006) who found that accuracy and confidence were sensitive to different variables.
Fluid capacities and reasoning. Links with fluid intelligence and n-term were examined using correlations and multiple regression analyses which are summarised in Tables 5 and 6 . Belief-based and analytic processing in transitive inference 27 (8.12%), no-conflict accuracy (10.3%) and fluid intelligence (3.10%) each accounted for significant independent variance, and 7.7% variance was shared. Thus, after controlling for markedness and no-conflict accuracy, individuals with higher fluid intelligence were better able to resolve the conflict between belief-based and analytic processes.
A similar analysis was conducted substituting n-term for fluid intelligence (N = 58). Nterm premise integration scores were significantly positively correlated with accuracy on conflict and no-conflict problems (Table 6 ). Markedness, no-conflict accuracy, and n-term scores together accounted for 35.6% variance in conflict problem accuracy, Multiple R = .597, F (3, 54) = 9.96, p < .001. Markedness (9%) and no-conflict accuracy (16.9%) each accounted for significant independent variance. The unique contribution of n-term (4.7%) was significant by 1-tailed test (p = .027), and 5% variance was shared. After controlling for markedness and no-conflict accuracy, there was a trend for individuals with better integration abilities to more effectively resolve the conflict between belief-based and analytic processes.
In summary, Experiment 3 replicated the main findings of Experiments 1 and 2.
Acceptance and confidence rates suggested that belief-based and analytical processes were employed in transitive inference. Participants experienced more difficulty and were less confident when these processes conflicted. Less belief-based processing and more analytic processing occurred when premise integration was facilitated by using only unmarked forms of the relational terms in the premises rather than in both marked and unmarked forms.
Individuals with higher fluid intelligence and better premise integration abilities were better able to resolve conflict between analytic and belief-based processes.
General Discussion
The main findings to be accounted for are the lower accuracy and lower confidence rates for conflict than no-conflict problems, the effects of manipulations of premise integration difficulty on believability and validity effects, and the associations between the measures of Belief-based and analytic processing in transitive inference 28 fluid capacity (fluid intelligence, n-term) and the resolution of conflict between belief-based and analytic processes.
The three experiments suggest that belief-based and analytic processes are employed when people make transitive inferences. Significant effects of validity and believability were observed on acceptance rates in all experiments and problems in which belief-based and analytic processing conflicted were consistently more difficult than problems that involved no such conflict. Expressed levels of confidence showed a similar pattern. These findings are generally consistent with previous studies of belief bias in categorical syllogisms.
Transitive inference is more similar to relational inferences than to categorical syllogisms; therefore the present findings will be compared to Robert and Sykes' (2003) .
Their serial presentation condition (Experiment 1) was similar to the present procedure in that premises were removed before conclusions were presented. Robert and Sykes observed a significant main effect of validity, but there was no evidence of belief-based processing in their serial condition. They speculated that this might be due to premises and conclusions being presented separately. The present findings do not support this interpretation because believability effects were observed with separate presentation of premises and conclusions.
However, all premises were presented at once in the current research suggesting that sequential presentation of the premises in Roberts and Sykes' serial condition might be responsible for the difference between studies. Roberts and Sykes found significant believability effects on one-model problems in the parallel condition where premises and conclusions were presented simultaneously. However they were smaller in magnitude (5% -6%) than in the present experiments (10% -29%). The inclusion of false premises in all problem types in Roberts and Sykes, but only in VU and IB problems in the present research might account for this difference.
As noted in the introduction, the greater difficulty and lower confidence observed for
Belief-based and analytic processing in transitive inference 29 conflict than no-conflict problems in all conditions of the three experiments are consistent with reasoning-first, default interventionist and parallel-process models. Belief-based processes involve retrieval of existing knowledge from long-term memory, whereas analytic processes including premise integration involve working memory. It is difficult to account for the greater difficulty and lower confidence levels for conflict problems without assuming that people engaged both processes.
Manipulation of premise integration difficulty had consistent effects on belief-based and analytic processing. Table 7 shows the magnitude of the validity and believability effects, expressed as mean differences in acceptance rates. The baseline condition combines the 20-sec premise encoding/integration (Experiment 1), the scrambled premise order (Experiment 2) and the mixed markedness (Experiment 3) conditions. Premise integration in this baseline condition is ternary-relational and this level of complexity imposes a measureable processing load in young adults (Maybery et al., 1986) . Premise integration was expected to be more difficult than baseline in the 10-sec condition and easier than baseline in the consistent order and the unmarked only conditions. Table 7 shows, as predicted, that believability effects were larger and validity effects were smaller when premise integration was more difficult. The effects of the manipulations of premise encoding/integration difficulty on acceptance rates and accuracy replicated previous findings (e.g., Stupple & Ball, 2008) . They supported parallel-process and reasoning-first models more strongly than default interventionist model, as noted earlier.
In Experiment 3, individual differences in fluid intelligence and in premise integration ability predicted accuracy on conflict problems (VU, IB), after controlling for accuracy on non-conflict problems (VB, IU) and for markedness. This is consistent with Stanovitch and West's (2008) conclusion that the need to resolve a conflict is a key factor that determines when significant associations between fluid abilities and reasoning biases will be observed.
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The findings are also consistent with Quayle and Ball's (2000) finding of a larger belief bias on indeterminately invalid syllogisms for those with low working memory capacity. The observed associations are notable given that the restricted range of fluid abilities among undergraduate students compared to the general population. These findings are consistent with three classes of dual-process models described above.
According to Sloman (1996) the demonstration of conflict effects constitutes necessary and sufficient evidence for the existence of two mental systems, each supporting one of the conflicting responses. However, Keren and Schul (2009) argued that conflicting mental states might be generated by a single system that can alternate between different modes of operation. Logical validity and believability might be two different types of external criteria that the single system uses to evaluate statements. Thus while conflict effects are compatible with dual-process models, they are not uniquely predicted by such models. The present findings do not eliminate single-system accounts such as this.
The findings extend earlier research on categorical syllogisms and relational inference tasks by providing the first evidence of belief bias in transitive inference. The extent of belief-based versus analytic processing depended on the difficulty of premise encoding and integration, which was manipulated in three different ways. The research demonstrates the value of targeted manipulations that are based on an understanding of how participants perform the reasoning task being studied.
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Examples of the Four Problem Types
Inference type Premises Conclusion
Valid believable (VB) The mouse is smaller than the dog
The elephant is larger than the cow
The dog is smaller than the goat
The cow is larger than the goat Therefore the cow is larger than the dog
Valid unbelievable (VU)
The mandarin is sweeter than the lemon
The grapefruit is sweeter than the orange
The mandarin is less sweet than the orange
The grapefruit is less sweet than the cherry Therefore the grapefruit is sweeter than the mandarin Invalid believable (IB) The car is faster than the bicycle
The tractor is faster than the train
The car is slower than the train Therefore the car is faster than the tractor Belief-based and analytic processing in transitive inference 37
The tractor is slower than the jet Invalid unbelievable (IU) The tuna is smaller than the shark
The flounder is larger than the prawn
The shark is smaller than the whale
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